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Prospective memory (PM) is an essential ability in daily life, since it involves remembering
to perform an intention. While PM largely develops during childhood and adolescence,
its underlying mechanisms are still poorly understood. In general, age differences in PM
have been found with tasks in which the prospective cues are not part of the ongoing
activity (non-focal PM tasks). In the present study, we evaluated the cognitive cost
produced by a PM task over the ongoing activity by comparing the performance of
a single-task condition with that of an ongoing activity condition involving a prospective
intention. Specifically, to determine the impact of cue focality on performance as a
function of age, we tested two groups of children (6 and 11 years old) in three
experimental conditions: single, focal and non-focal prospective cues. In the single-
task condition, children were only asked to perform the ongoing task (to categorize
images as animal or non-animal). In the focal condition, in addition to performing the
ongoing activity, participants were asked to press different keys whenever the image
appearing on the screen was a kite or a ball. In the non-focal condition, children were
to press the keys if the color of the frame of the screen changed to magenta or gray.
Although reaction times were greater for the non-focal conditions in both age groups,
the results showed worse performance on the ongoing activity for both the focal and
the non-focal conditions (relative to the single-task condition) in the younger children.
This difference was less pronounced in older children so that response times for focal
and non-focal cues differed from the single condition, but the difference in performance
between focal and single task conditions was not reliable. These findings, which are
partly in line with the dual process framework (McDaniel et al., 2015), suggest that
while non-focal prospective cues compromise attentional control in younger and older
children, focal cues seem to rely on less effortful processes in older children.
Keywords: prospective memory, cue focality, cognitive cost, children, development
INTRODUCTION
Prospective memory (PM) is the ability to remember to complete a future intention (Brandimonte
et al., 1996). This ability is essential to success in daily life activities, such as remembering to
make an important call or take a pill after breakfast. In children, low PM performance could
disrupt school life; for example, a child may forget to give his/her parents a permission slip or
bring his/her homework to class (Kvavilashvili et al., 2001). In a typical PM task, participants are
asked to carry out an ongoing task (OT) while also remembering to perform a prospective task,
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either when they encounter a specific cue embedded within the
OT or when a specific time has elapsed (Kvavilashvili et al.,
2001). Prospective recall is a time-based PM task that requires
the person to remember to perform an action at a specific time
or time interval, and event-based PM tasks involve remembering
to perform an intention upon the occurrence of a specific event
(McDaniel and Einstein, 2000). The present study focuses on the
latter type of PM task and tries to identify age differences in the
possible costs associated with maintaining a prospective intention
while performing an ongoing task.
Previous research has suggested that successfully
remembering an intention involves four main processes:
forming an intention, maintaining the intention until the
appropriate cue or time is present, initiating the intended
action when the cue is detected (event or time) and, finally,
executing the intention (Kliegel et al., 2002). According to
the preparatory attentional and memory processes (PAM)
theory, these processes consume attention and generate a
cost in the OT (Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 2010). Thus, to
monitor the environment for cues that signal retrieval of the
intention, participants should maintain a state of readiness
during the OT. Although these processes may be outside
of conscious awareness, they consume resources, impairing
OT performance. This claim has been supported by various
experiments reporting slower performance and lower accuracy
for the OT while trying to remember an intention, relative
to a control condition in which the OT is performed by itself
(Craik et al., 1996; Park et al., 1997; Smith, 2003; Anderson
et al., 1998; Smith et al., 2007). For example, Smith (2003)
reported that participants were 300 milliseconds (ms) slower in
performing a lexical-decision task (deciding whether or not a
string of letters formed a word) when they were also instructed to
prospectively remember a particular word (PM intention) than
when they were not asked to remember a word. Similarly, Smith
et al. (2010) reported lower performance in a color-matching
task when participants were required to press another key
when a particular image appeared on the screen (PM task). In
general, results comparing OTs with and without concurrent
prospective intentions suggest that participants strategically
allocate resources to monitor PM cues, imposing a cost on
the OT.
Strategic allocation of resources to a PM task has also been
related to working memory (WM) capacity. WM is needed to
keep an intention in mind and to update the task goal when
a cue is encountered (Einstein et al., 2000). Several studies
have reported a relationship between WM and prospective recall
performance (Smith and Bayen, 2005; Wang et al., 2008; Mahy
and Moses, 2011). For example, Smith and Bayen (2005) found
that WM capacity predicted the extent to which participants
engaged in preparatory attentional processes to perform a PM
task. Participants with higher span scores showed greater costs
than participants with lower span scores in the OT, indicating
that high-span participants were more prone to engage in
preparatory attentional processes. Similarly, Cheie et al. (2017)
showed that increasing processing demands on the OT or
imposing an additional WM span on children compromised their
performance.
However, the PAM theory assumption that prospective
remembering always requires preparatory attentional processes
has been questioned. According to the dual process framework,
PM retrieval could be spontaneous or effortful, depending on the
task demands (Einstein et al., 1997; McDaniel et al., 2015). For
example, Basso et al. (2010) manipulated the cognitive demands
of WM and PM dimensions on an event-based prospective
task. The ongoing activity was either a WM-updating task
involving higher or lower demands or a lexical decision task (low
WM demands). The prospective task required the participants
to respond whenever a previously presented word appeared.
The results pattern was complex because PM only affected
performance on the WM task at higher loads. By contrast, the
pattern for the lower WM conditions showed that performance
was independent of the concurrent PM task. Similarly, a number
of studies have shown no cost to the OT with successful PM
performance (Harrison and Einstein, 2010; Scullin et al., 2010;
Knight et al., 2011; Scullin et al., 2011), suggesting that, in some
cases, cue monitoring might not be attentionally costly.
More direct evidence for the dual process framework
(McDaniel et al., 2015) comes from studies manipulating the
focality of the prospective cue. Focality is manipulated under
the assumption that the degree to which attentional resources
are demanded for cue monitoring depends on whether the PM
task involves focal or non-focal cues. Focal PM tasks are those
in which the OT involves processing the defining features of
the PM cues (e.g., categorizing strings of letters as words/non-
words and pressing another key whenever a predetermined target
word appears as a PM task; Einstein and Mcdaniel, 2005). By
contrast, non-focal tasks involve PM cues that are not part of
the information extracted from the OT for accurate performance
(e.g., deciding whether the word on the left is a member of
the category on the right as an OT and pressing another key
whenever the word includes the syllable “tor”; Einstein and
Mcdaniel, 2005). In focal PM tasks, the OT forces processing of
the PM target, potentially requiring spontaneous non-attentional
retrieval. By contrast, in non-focal PM tasks, monitoring for
external cues is necessary because there is no overlap between
the information needed for the OT and that needed for PM
performance. In this case, effortful monitoring should be invested
to detect the PM cue and to switch from the OT to the PM.
According to this proposal, cue focality should have clear effects
on monitoring and cue detection, since the ability to strategically
monitor for environmental cues may depend on whether the OT
orients attention to the relevant contextual PM cue. For example,
in Ball and Bugg’s (2018, Experiment 1) study, participants were
asked to perform a lexical decision task (OT) and to detect a
syllable embedded in some words. They were specifically told that
the syllable occurred in words, but not in non-word trials (focal
context cue condition). By contrast, in the non-focal condition,
they were told that the syllable appeared only in items starting
with consonants (non-focal context cue condition). Strategic
monitoring (resulting in an OT cost for the PM condition relative
to the single-OT control condition) was only evident during the
focal condition, in which the type of OT processing automatically
oriented attention to the relevant features of the contextual cue.
These findings suggest that strategic monitoring is dependent
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on limited-capacity processing resources and may be relatively
limited when the attentional demands of context identification
are sufficiently high.
Because these processes require efficient WM and executive
control capacity, another important factor in PM performance
is age. In general, research has shown that the development of
PM across the lifespan follows an inverted U path, with PM
increasing from preschool to adolescence and decreasing from
late adulthood (Zimmermann and Meier, 2006; Zöllig et al.,
2007). OT costs have been found in adult populations, but also
in children. For example, Leigh and Marcovitch (2014) reported
PM costs in young children (4, 5, and 6 years old) categorizing
images (as animals/non-animals or food/non-food) when they
were also asked to press a smiley face button whenever they
saw a particular image. However, although some studies have
included OT performance as a covariate (Kliegel and Jäger, 2007;
Kvavilashvili et al., 2008), few studies have focused on PM costs
during OT performance by themselves, and these effects are
not completely understood (Leigh and Marcovitch, 2014). In
addition, the lower performance of children in OTs might be
due to less efficient cognitive processing (resulting in more costly
PM), but also to deficient strategies related to allocating resources
to the PM task.
One way to approach this problem is to manipulate the
attentional demands of the PM task (e.g., by manipulating cue
focality) and explore the effects of this manipulation in children
of different ages. This approach has been followed with younger
and older adults (see Henry et al., 2004, for a review). For
example, Rendell et al. (2007) manipulated the presence of
focal and non-focal PM cues in younger and older adults and
found that age-related differences on PM performance were more
pronounced when the cue was non-focal.
Age differences in more demanding non-focal tasks have also
been shown in studies comparing adolescents and young adults
(Wang et al., 2011). Wang et al. (2011) manipulated the focality
of the cue and found that the adult group outperformed the
adolescent group in the non-focal PM condition. They used
ongoing spatial WM tasks in which participants were asked to
press a target key whenever a specific embedded target appeared
(focal condition) or whenever the background color of the WM
trials changed to a specific color (non-focal). Response times
for the ongoing WM task showed group differences only when
the PM task involved non-focal intentions, suggesting that age
differences might specially arise in cases involving more difficult
monitoring and cue detection. Finally, Kliegel et al. (2013)
compared 6- and 7-year-old and 9- and 10-year-old children who
played a videogame requiring them to drive a vehicle. In the
non-focal condition, the PM cue was a yellow flowerpot located
outside the road, and in the focal condition, the cue was a yellow
car also in the road. Performance in the PM task was lower in
the 6- and 7-year children than the 9- and 10-year-old children
in both conditions, suggesting that both focal and non-focal cues
require attentional resources. However, when performance on the
OT was included as a covariate, age differences appeared when
the cue was outside of the center of attention.
However, Kliegel et al. (2013) found mixed results and did
not report direct comparisons of the children’s performance
on the OT. Thus, the main aim of the present study was to
address the role of cue focality in children of different ages
by examining PM performance and ongoing cost. We directly
compared children’s (6 and 11 years old) performance in the
OT in conditions in which they performed the OT by itself
(single-task condition) and in conjunction with a focal or a non-
focal PM task. We chose 6-year-olds and 11-year-olds for our
groups because previous research has shown differences in PM
between these two age groups (Smith et al., 2010; Kliegel et al.,
2013) and there is evidence that WM capacity, goal maintenance,
inhibition and other related cognitive abilities increase from the
age of six (Marcovitch et al., 2007; Towse et al., 2007; Marcovitch
et al., 2010; Henry, 2011; López-Vicente et al., 2016). First,
in line Kliegel et al. (2013) findings, we expected to observe
better PM performance in the older group than in the younger
group in the non-focal condition, but no age differences in the
focal condition. Second, based on the findings of Smith et al.
(2010), we expected the non-focal PM task to produce worse OT
performance in both age groups relative to the focal condition.
Smith et al. (2010) observed a PM cost in 6- and 10-year-old
children when a single-task condition was compared to another
condition including a non-focal PM task. Regarding the focal
condition, and based on Leigh and Marcovitch’s (2014) results,
we expected to observe a PM cost in our younger (6-year-
old) group. Our expectations for the 10-year-old group were
less clear, since no study has yet reported data on focal PM
costs in late childhood. However, because overall age-related
differences are usually more pronounced under non-focal cues
(e.g., Rendell et al., 2007; Kliegel et al., 2008; Scullin et al., 2010;
Wang et al., 2011), one could predict a lesser cost (or even




We recruited 95 children from a local primary school in Granada
(Spain). The younger group consisted of 45 children (23 boys and
22 girls) who were 6 years old (M = 6.88, SD = 0.29), and the older
group consisted of 50 children (26 boys and 24 girls) who were
11 years old (M = 11, SD = 0.39). The number of participants
per group (approximately 50) was decided in advance based on
the sample sizes considered in previous studies with children
(e.g., Smith et al., 2010; Mahy et al., 2014). All participants
were born in Spain and spoke Spanish as their mother language.
The children were recruited through an informative talk for
their parents in the school. The study was approved and carried
out in accordance with the recommendations of the Research
Ethics Committee of the University of Granada. All parents of
participants were provided with information about the study
and gave written informed consent in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki. The participants belonged to families
with medium socioeconomic status, as measured through their
income index. To minimize the error variance, all participants
performed all three experimental conditions: single-task, focal
and non-focal. Hence, the study comprised a mixed design with
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age (6 vs. 11) and experimental condition as variables (between
and within participants, respectively).
Procedure
The experimental tasks used here were adapted from standard
PM tasks used in previous studies with children (Mahy et al.,
2014; Cottini et al., 2018). Before conducting the present
experiment, a pilot study with ten 6-year-old children and ten
11-year-old children was carried out to ensure that children
of these ages were able to successfully perform the focal and
non-focal conditions and that we were able to obtain levels of
performance similar to those of previous experiments. In the
preliminary study, children were asked to perform the focal and
non-focal tasks in random order. As the ongoing activity in
both conditions, they had to categorize images that appeared
on the screen as animals or not animals. In the focal condition,
along with the categorization activity, children were asked not to
categorize the ball or kite images but to press particular keys. In
the non-focal condition, they had to stop the ongoing activity and
press particular keys whenever the border of the screen changed
to magenta or gray. The results of the pilot study showed that
all the children were able to perform the PM task with levels of
performance similar to previous studies (see Kliegel et al., 2013).
In the focal condition, there was no difference between 6-year-
old (M = 0.91, SD = 0.13) and 11-year-old (M = 0.92, SD = 0.06)
children, t(18) < 1. In contrast, the analyses revealed statistically
significant differences between the younger (M= 0.44, SD = 0.13)
and the older (M = 0.71, SD = 0.09) children in the non-focal
condition, t(18) = 5.23, p < 0.01, d = 2.41. Since these results are
in line with those obtained by Kliegel et al. (2013), we conducted
the proper experiment with a focus on the cost of focal and
non-focal PM cues over the ongoing activity.
As in the preliminary study, testing was conducted
individually in the school and lasted approximately 20 min.
The testing session took place during school hours, and the
children were taken out of their classroom during the testing.
Each session consisted of three parts corresponding to each of
the experimental conditions (single-task, focal and non-focal),
whose order of administration was randomized.
In all three conditions, children were asked to perform a single
task (OT) that consisted of categorizing pictures as animal or
non-animal. We used 65 images taken from the work of Rossion
and Pourtois (2004). Each was repeated twice during the three
parts of the experiment. Half of the images referred to animals,
and the other half did not. The stimuli appeared in the center
of the screen surrounded by 15 pixel color border, which was
randomly changed for each presentation of the stimuli (red, blue,
green or yellow). The children were asked to press the key “yes”
(placed on the “a” in the keyboard) whenever an animal item
appeared and the key “no” (placed on the “s) whenever a non-
animal item appeared. In the focal condition, the prospective
focal task was included in the OT. Children were asked to
remember to press a different key whenever a target picture (a
kite or a ball) appeared. Whenever the kite appeared, they had to
press the key “start” (placed on the “k”), and whenever the ball
appeared, they had to press the key “square“ (placed on the “l“).
In the non-focal condition, the children performed the OT and
were also asked to press a different key when the picture frame
had a particular color (magenta or gray). Specifically, whenever
the screen border was magenta, they were asked to press the key
“start (placed on the “k“), and whenever the border was gray, they
were to press the key “square” (place on the “l”).
In each condition, the experiment had the following structure:
First, the participants received the instructions for the single-
task condition and practiced the task on nine trials. Then, after
being informed that the tests had started, they moved to the
experimental trials. The order in which the three conditions were
presented to each participant was random. In the single-task
condition, the participants faced 50 trials. In the focal condition,
they were told about the prospective intention and practiced the
OT task, which included four PM targets. When they correctly
performed two of these four targets, they started the test that
included 50 ongoing trials with five PM trials. We chose this PM
trial frequency based on previous studies with children of similar
ages (Kliegel and Jäger, 2007; Ford et al., 2012; ). The non-focal
condition used the same structure, but involved instructing the
participants about the non-focal cues. There was a short break
(about 2 min.) between conditions, during which the children
were given the instructions to perform the next block: “Now, I am
going to explain the next game to you. Are you ready for this?”
After all participants had been assessed, they received a gift for
their participation.
The PM trials appeared in the focal condition in the 10th, 23rd,
32nd, 42nd and 54th positions. In the non-focal condition, the
PM trials were in the 8th, 19th, 32nd, 45th and 54th positions.
In the focal condition, two of the PM trials showed a kite,
two showed a ball, and the fifth cue varied randomly across
participants. In the non-focal condition, half of the target’s frames
were magenta, and the rest were grey. The dependent measures
were the proportion of correct responses and the reaction time.
Stimuli presentation during the OT and PM trials was set
to a minimum of 1600 ms and a maximum of 2800 ms. When
participants responded after 1600 ms, the next trials occurred
after an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 250 ms. A response latency
shorter than 1600 ms was filled with a black screen until 1600 ms,
followed by the inter stimulus interval. If the participant did not
respond within 2800 ms, the inter-stimulus interval appeared.
RESULTS
While the focus of the present experiment is on the performance
of an ongoing task, we also report analyses of PM performance for
the sake of completeness. As expected from the pilot study [and
also the study by Kliegel et al. (2013)], focality had a reliable effect
for the 6-year-old group [F(1,44) = 16.18, MSe = 0.01, p < 0.01,
ηp
2 = 0.27], indicating better performance when the cue was
focal (M = 0.74, SD = 0.32) relative to the condition in which
the cue was non-focal (M = 0.50, SD = 0.32). The same pattern
was observed in the 11-year-old group [M = 0.92, SD = 0.16 vs.
M = 0.82, SD = 0.21; F(1,49) = 52.07, MSe = 0.00, p < 0.01,
ηp
2 = 0.51].
Performance in the ongoing task was analysed first by
conducting a 3 (condition) by 2 (age) ANOVA on the proportion
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of correct responses (Table 1). For each participant, correct
responses were averaged across conditions and introduced into
the analysis. Errors were evenly distributed across stimuli and
participants with no outliers. The analysis of accuracy showed an
effect of age [F(1,93) = 26.24, MSe = 0.01, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.22],
such that the older group performed the OT better than the
younger group. In addition, there was a reliable effect of condition
[F(2,92) = 41.42, MSe = 0.01, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.31]. Post-hoc
analyses using Bonferroni tests indicated that performance was
reliably lower in the non-focal condition than in the focal and
single-task conditions.
More relevant, there was a reliable interaction between age and
task condition [see Figure 1; F(2,92) = 4.59 MSe = 0.01, p = 0.01,
ηp
2 = 0.05], which was followed up by analyzing the effects of
condition on each age group. The analysis revealed a statistically
significant effect in the 6-year-old group [F(2,43) = 20.18,
MSe = 0.01, p < 0.01 ηp2 = 0.31]. Further analyses indicated
that performance was reliably worse in the non-focal condition
than in the focal [t(44) = 3.30, p < 0.01, d = 0.53] and
single-task [t(44) = 6.57, p < 0.01, d = 1.05] conditions. The
difference between the focal and single-task conditions also
reached statistical significance [t(44) = 2.89, p < 0.01, d = 0.47].
There was also a reliable effect of condition in the older
group of children [F(2,48) = 27.85, MSe = 0.00, p < 0.01,
ηp
2 = 0.36]. Performance in the non-focal condition differed
from performance in the focal [t(49) = 5.69, p < 0.01,
d = 0.91] and single-task conditions [t(49) = 6.33, p < 0.01,
d = 0.95]. In this group of children, however, the performance
difference between the single and focal conditions was not reliable
[t(49) < 1, d = –0.10].
We also performed a 3 (condition) by 2 (age) ANOVA for
reaction times on the ongoing task. Results of this analysis
revealed a reliable effect of condition [F (2,92) = 263.37,
MSe = 11555.34, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.74]. Bonferroni tests indicated
that responses were slower in the non-focal condition than the
focal and single-task conditions. Reaction times in the single-task
condition also differed from those in focal condition. The age
effect was also reliable [F(1,93) = 82.97, MSe = 52787.49, p< 0.01,
ηp
2 = 0.47]. The younger group took longer to respond than
the older group (M = 1096.53, SD = 134.86). More importantly,
there was a reliable interaction [F(2,92) = 11.29, MSe = 11555.34,
p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.11; see Figure 1]. The one-way ANOVA in
the 6-year-old group showed the effect of condition to be reliable
[F(2,43) = 64.11, MSe = 16512.18, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.59]. Reaction
TABLE 1 | Means of the proportions of correct OT responses and reaction times
(in ms).
6 years (n = 45) 11 years(n = 50) Mean
ACC RT ACC RT ACC RT
Single 0.93(0.07) 1213(178) 0.97(0.04) 939(135) 0.95(0.06) 1076(156)
Focal 0.89(0.12) 1322(150) 0.97(0.04) 1018(133) 0.93(0.08) 1170(141)
Non-focal 0.81(0.14) 1498(207) 0.91(0.07) 1331(135) 0.86(0.11) 1414(171)
Mean 0.88(0.11) 1344(178) 0.95(0.05) 5096(134)
Standard deviations are reported in brackets.
times were longer for non-focal trials than for focal [t(44) = 7.37,
p < 0.01, d = 0.97] and single [t(44) = 9.59, p < 0.01, d = 1.57]
trials. These children were also slower at responding in the focal
than the single-task condition [t(44) = 4.97, p < 0.01, d = 0.66).
A similar pattern of results emerged in the 11-year-old group
[F(2,48) = 24.92, MSe = 7824.79, p< 0.01, ηp2 = 0.85]. This group
was slower when responding to the OT in the non-focal condition
than in the focal [t(49) = 17.29, p< 0.01, d = 2.33] and single-task
[t(49) = 22.3, p < 0.01, d = 2.88 conditions. Reaction times for
the single trials were faster than reaction times for the focal trials
[t(49) = 4.52, p < 0.01, d = 0.58].
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the present experiment was two fold: First,
we aimed to test some of the predictions of the dual process
framework (McDaniel et al., 2015) by comparing young children’s
performance on the OT when cue focality was varied. The idea
was that performance on the OT would provide an index of the
cognitive costs associated with holding a prospective intention
and monitoring for appropriate cues. Our second aim was to
assess early developmental changes in the effect of the intention
over the OT. Previous research with adult participants (Smith,
2003) has shown a PM cost over the OT when a PM intention
is included. This cost has also been observed in 4-, 5- and 6-
year-old children (Leigh and Marcovitch, 2014). To estimate this
cost, we compared performance in a single-task condition (in
which children only performed the OT) with performance in two
prospective memory conditions varying in cue focality (focal vs.
non-focal).
The results for the OT show an interesting pattern. On one
hand, the reaction time findings are partly in line with the
predictions of the PAM theory: For both younger and older
children, holding a PM intention produced an OT cost such
that they were faster in the single-task condition than in the
focal and non-focal conditions. According to the PAM theory,
to retrieve an intention and perform the action, an individual
must maintain a state of readiness and monitor the elements of
both the OT and the environment for PM cues (Smith, 2003).
Interestingly, the cost varied across conditions, such that non-focal
cues produced longer reaction times, which suggests that different
cue conditions require different degrees of attention. Similarly, the
reaction time findings showed that holding the intention was more
costly for younger than for older children and that the difference
between focal and non-focal cues was also more pronounced for
younger children. On the other hand, the accuracy during the
OT showed a very similar pattern so that younger and older
children exhibited different degrees of impairment depending
on the focality of the cue. Thus, although both had a similar
cost when the cues were non-focal, older children were more
efficient in the focal condition. Despite the focal and single-task
conditions not showing differences in accuracy, the differences
in reaction time between these two conditions suggest that both
focal and non-focal PM tasks produce a cost over the OT, even
though this cost is less pronounced in the focal task and in older
children. These findings agree, in part, with the dual process
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FIGURE 1 | Ongoing performance. (A) Proportion of correct responses as a function of age and condition. (B) Reaction time as a function of age and condition.
Error bars represent standard desviations.
framework (McDaniel et al., 2015) and suggest that when there
is an overlap between the processing required to perform the
OT and the prospective task, remembering the intention is less
effortful and that different degrees of attention are involved in
processing focal and non-focal cues.
Our pattern of results was similar to that observed by
Wang et al. (2011), who found that adolescents and adults
exhibited greater cost over the OT when the cue was non-
focal than when it was focal. Hence, our older children behaved
as adolescents and young adults usually do. While our study
did not include any measure of executive functioning, previous
studies have related some executive control processes, such
as flexibility (Mahy and Munakata, 2015), inhibitory control
(Wang et al., 2008) and monitoring abilities (Nigro et al.,
2014), to PM performance. Thus, our finding that the older
children outperformed the younger ones could be related to the
development of their executive functioning. Future studies using
the present experimental paradigm should include measures of
executive function.
From a developmental perspective, our findings suggest that
there are relevant changes from 6 to 11 years of age that make
older children more efficient than their younger counterparts in
dealing with PM tasks. Older children committed fewer errors
and had shorter reaction times than younger children when they
performed the OT while trying to remember a PM intention.
Interestingly, the interaction between focality and age for OT
response times showed that the older children were better able
to reallocate their attention depending on the difficulty of the
task. Thus, the magnitude of the difference between the focal
and non-focal conditions was larger (Cohen’s d = 2.33) for
the older group than the younger group (Cohen’s d = 0.97).
Although both increased their times when the PM cue was non-
focal (the difference between focal and non-focal conditions was
significant for both groups), this increment was larger for the
older children. Hence, the older children seemed better able
to detect the difficulty of the non-focal task and allocate more
resources (relative to the younger children) to cue monitoring.
In line with this finding, previous studies have shown that
metacognition affects PM performance. Kvavilashvili and Ford
(2014), for example, found that PM performance was more
accurate in children who better predicted their own performance.
More recently, Cottini et al. (2018) found better performance
in a categorical PM task in children with high declarative
metamemory (relative to children with low metamemory).
Importantly, metamemory was found to have no effect on the
specific PM task, which is thought to be less demanding than the
categorical task. These findings support the theory that children
who are good at predicting how well they will do on PM tasks
are also better able to choose the most appropriate strategy to
deal with the task at hand. Hence, performance from our older
children could have stemmed from better predictions of their
PM performance, which, in turn, allowed for better adjustment
to the requirements of the focal and non-focal tasks. While this
interpretation fits well with our results, it should be corroborated
in future studies involving more direct measures.
However, the fact that both 6- and 11-year-old children
performed better on focal than non-focal PM tasks suggests that,
though less efficiently, younger children are also able to monitor
for cues and be sensitive to their focality. These developmental
findings are consistent with those of Smith et al. (2010), who
showed a PM cost for 7- and 10-year-old children and adults,
and those of Leigh and Marcovitch (2014), who found that this
cost is also present in 4-year-old children. These findings suggest
that even at a very young age, children can engage in preparatory
attentional processes and monitoring strategies for a PM cue, thus
reducing their performance on the OT.
Although the pattern of results is clear and consistent with
previous findings, the study is not without limitations. First,
although our sample size was large enough to detect the
interaction between focality and age, a larger sample might have
shown more pronounced age differences. Second, we only used
one type of focal and non-focal cue, and it could be possible that
other cues might have produced different results. For example,
PM tasks involving less salient cues might produce greater cost in
the children’s performance, with younger children showing more
difficulties relocating the resources needed for remembering the
intention. Hence, to be able to generalize our findings, further
studies should include more than one type of PM task with
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 January 2019 | Volume 9 | Article 2738
fpsyg-09-02738 January 5, 2019 Time: 10:56 # 7
Cejudo et al. The Cost of PM in Children
different relations between the PM and the OT (e.g., a PM focal
task in which the PM cue is not part of the materials used
in the OT or a non-focal task involving other than perceptual
information). Despite these limitations, our results are important
and possess clear implications. Parents and teachers occasionally
assume that when children start school they are prepared to
effectively fulfil the responsibilities that are required at school,
such as giving their parents a permission slip or remembering
to bring course materials. However, our results suggest that
these tasks can be highly demanding for them and that younger
children might need to learn simple strategies that help them
efficiently allocate their resources to be able to recall their
intentions.
In sum, the results of the present study show that, under
some conditions (focal cues and older children), holding a PM
intention produces lower costs during OT performance and that,
therefore, cue monitoring and intentional retrieval might not
always play a main role in PM. This evidence is partially in line
with the dual process framework (McDaniel et al., 2015), since
the fact that reaction times were slower for both the focal and
the non-focal conditions relative to the single-task conditions for
both younger and older children suggests that the involvement
of attentional processes is a question of degree, such that either
more or less resources are necessary depending on task focality.
While focal PM tasks affect RT but not accuracy, non-focal tasks
hamper both accuracy and response times. This pattern advances
an interesting problem, given that the role of cue focality is
not completely clear; while some studies have failed to reveal
differences between focal and non-focal cues (Kliegel et al., 2013),
others have shown the opposite pattern: namely, a greater cost for
focal than non-focal cues (Ball and Bugg, 2018). Most likely, cue
focality interacts with the type of OT, such that effective resource
allocation to the PM task depends on the amount of demands
of both the PM and the OT. Further studies should explore this
interaction and how it modulates children’s ability to strategically
remember performing actions in the future.
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